Abstract-This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of the replication framework of Deno, a decentralized, peer-to-peer object-replication system targeted for weakly connected environments. Deno uses weighted voting for availability and pair-wise, epidemic information flow for flexibility. This combination allows the protocols to operate with less than full connectivity, to easily adapt to changes in group membership, and to make few assumptions about the underlying network topology. We present two versions of Deno's protocol that differ in the consistency levels they support. We also propose security extensions to handle a class of malicious actions that involve misrepresentation of protocol information. Deno has been implemented and runs on top of Linux and Win32 platforms. We use the Deno prototype to characterize the performance of the Deno protocols and extensions. Our study reveals several interesting results that provide fundamental insight into the benefits of decentralization and the mechanics of epidemic protocols.
INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper describes the design, implementation, and performance of Deno [10] , [13] , [14] , [25] , a system that support object replication in a transactional framework for weakly connected environments. Deno's system model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . One or more clients connect to each peer server, which communicates through pair-wise information exchanges. The servers are not necessarily ever fully connected. Deno's application domain include asynchronous groupware applications (e.g., Lotus Notes [24] ), traditional file and database systems, and distributed middleware systems that require asynchronous consensus support.
Deno's underlying protocols are based on an asynchronous protocol called bounded weighted voting [25] . Asynchronous solutions for managing replicated data [7] , [21] , [24] , [26] have a number of advantages over traditional synchronous replication protocols in large-scale and weakly connected environments. They can operate with less than full connectivity, easily adapt to frequent changes in group membership, and make few demands on the underlying network topology. However, this functionality comes at a price: Asynchronous solutions are generally either slow or require reconciliation or have low availability because they rely on primary-copy schemes [33] .
The protocols retain the advantages of current asynchronous protocols, but generally perform better, have fewer connectivity requirements, and achieve higher availability. No server ever needs to have complete knowledge of group membership and a given server only needs to be in intermittent contact with at least one other server to take full part in the voting and commitment process. As such, the protocol is highly suited for environments with weak connectivity.
The protocol's strengths result from a combination of weighted voting and epidemic information flow [17] , a process where information flows pair-wise through the system (much like a disease passing from one host to the next). The protocol is completely decentralized. There is no primary server that owns an item or serializes the updates to that item (as in Bayou [34] ). Any server can create new object replicas and servers need only be able to communicate with a minimum of one other server at a time in order to make progress. Instead of synchronously assembling quorums, which has been extensively addressed by previous work (e.g., [20] , [23] , [35] ), votes are cast and disseminated among servers asynchronously through pairwise propagation. Servers commit or abort transactions locally and all servers eventually reach the same decisions.
The use of voting allows the system to have higher availability than primary-copy protocols [1] , [4] , [20] , [30] , [35] . The use of weighted voting allows implementations to improve performance by adapting currency (a.k.a. weight) distributions to site availabilities, update activity, or other relevant characteristics [9] . Each server has a specific amount of currency and the total currency in the system is fixed at a known value. The advantage of a static total is that servers can determine when a plurality or majority of the votes has been accumulated without complete knowledge of group membership. This last attribute is key in dynamic, wide-area environments because it allows the protocol to operate in a completely decentralized fashion, eliminating performance bottlenecks and single points of failure.
The use of epidemic protocols divorces protocol requirements from communication requirements. First, an epidemic algorithm only requires protocol information to move throughout the system eventually. The lack of hard deadlines and connectivity requirements is ideally suited to weakly connected environments, where individual nodes are routinely disconnected. Second, epidemic protocols remove reliance on network topology. Synchronization partners in epidemic protocols can be chosen randomly, eliminating the single point of failures that occur with more structured communication patterns such as spanning trees.
The key contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, we present decentralized, peer-to-peer replication protocols that combine weighted voting and asynchronous, epidemic information flow. This combination enables our protocols to operate with less than full connectivity, easily adapt to changes in group membership, and make few assumptions about the underlying network topology. We describe in detail the consistency levels provided by the protocols and outline formal correctness proofs.
Second, we discuss an extension of our replication protocols to provide security against a specific class of internal security threats that involve misrepresentation of protocol-specific voting information. To handle such threats, we propose a vote validation technique that requires cryptographic primitives and modifications to the update commit criteria. A unique aspect of our solution is that it not only enables a trade off between performance and the degree of tolerance to malicious servers, but also allows for individual servers to support nonuniform degrees of tolerance without adversely affecting the performance of the rest of the system.
Third, we present the design of the Deno prototype system that implements the proposed protocols. The basic Deno architecture has been implemented and runs on top of Linux and Win32 platforms. We conduct a detailed performance study of our protocols and other comparable epidemic protocols that appeared in the literature using the Deno prototype. Our study provides fundamental insight into the benefits of decentralization and mechanics of epidemic protocols. One particularly interesting result of our evaluation is that the presumed performance advantage of the centralized approach over a decentralized voting approach is not significant with asynchronous, epidemic information flow.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the basic Deno system model and the decentralized replication protocols employed by Deno in detail. Section 3 briefly addresses security issues and describes a security extension based on vote validation. Section 4 summarizes other Deno features that promote weaklyconnected operation. Section 5 presents our prototypebased performance study that characterizes the performance of the replication protocols and their extensions as well as other competitive epidemic protocols. Section 6 briefly describes related work and Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper. Finally, the Appendix provides correctness proofs for the proposed Deno protocols as well as pseudocode for basic Deno operations.
DECENTRALIZED REPLICATION PROTOCOLS
Before delving into the fine detail, we give a quick overview of the life of a Deno transaction (Fig. 2 depicts the entire process in more detail). A transaction is submitted by a client to any server, which executes the transaction locally. Upon completion of the execution, the transaction either blocks (if the local server has seen a conflicting transaction) or becomes a candidate and participates in the election. Candidates are voted on and are eventually either committed (when/if they corner a plurality of the total system currency) or aborted.
Deno System Architecture
We now briefly describe the architecture of the Deno object replication system. The basic Deno API supports operations for creating objects, creating and deleting object replicas, and performing reads and writes on the shared objects in a transactional framework. Fig. 3 illustrates the Deno server architecture. The Server Manager is in charge of coordinating the activities of the various components and handling client requests by implementing the Deno API. The Consistency Controller implements the decentralized voting protocols and maintains a vote pool that summarizes the votes known to the server. The Synch Controller implements efficient synchronization sessions with other Deno servers by maintaining version vectors that compactly summarize the events of interests. The Trans Manager handles the local execution of transactions. It maintains a transaction pool that contains all active transactions known to the server. The Storage Manager provides access to the object store that stores the current committed versions of all locally replicated objects. The object store is currently implemented as a simple inmemory database. The current prototype runs on top of Linux and Win32 platforms. Communication is made over IP using UDP or TCP.
Providing Weak Consistency: Base Protocol
We now describe the basic Deno protocol, describing in detail the primary data structures, the transaction and the synchronization models, and the processing rules. Appendix B provides a detailed pseudocode that describes the implementation of these models and rules in detail.
Transaction Model
A transaction consists of a sequence of read and write operations on replicated data items. A transaction reads a set of read items and updates a subset of the read items called update items. Database states are tracked by associating a version number with each database item. The items in the local copy of the database are modified and their version numbers incremented only when update transactions commit.
We distinguish between queries (i.e., read-only transactions) and update transactions. Both types of transactions execute entirely locally. However, queries are light weight in that a query can commit immediately after it successfully finishes its execution. Update transactions, on the other hand, must participate in a distributed commitment process after finishing execution.
Each server maintains an active transaction list that contains active transactions, i.e., transactions that are being executed. While a transaction is executing, it constructs a transaction record that summarizes the transaction's execution state. When an active update transaction successfully completes its execution, it takes one of the following two paths: 1) The transaction can either become a candidate transaction at its local server and participate in a distributed voting process that determines whether it commits or aborts or 2) the transaction blocks and waits for the termination of other previous transactions before becoming a candidate. The blocked transactions are later reconsidered for becoming candidates.
Voting
We define V i as the set of all votes seen by server s i . A vote, v 2 V i , is a 4-tuple (voter, trans, curr, tstamp) where v.voter denotes the server that casts the vote, v.trans denotes the transaction the vote is cast for, v.curr denotes the amount of currency v.voter voted for v.trans, and v.tstamp is the value of v.voter's local timestamp that is incremented each time the server casts a vote.
Two transactions are said to conflict if 1) their common read items have the same version numbers and 2) at least one of the transaction's read items overlaps with the other's update items.
A server, s i , votes for a transaction by creating a vote, v, assigning a currency value to v, and inserting it into V i . The currency value for a vote can be set in two distinct ways based on the state of the vote set. Server s i votes all of its currency for transaction t i if s i has not already voted for a conflicting candidate transaction. Such a vote is called a yes vote and is an indication of the support of the server for the corresponding transaction. Otherwise, s i votes with 0 currency, in which case the vote is called a no vote. In the rest of the paper, when we speak about a vote without indicating its type, we imply a yes vote by default.
We now describe the voting process from the perspective of a single server. Each server s i maintains the following major data structures:
. candidate transaction for which the server has also voted. If the server votes for a blocked transaction, the transaction becomes a candidate transaction and is moved from the blocked list to the candidate list. Once created, votes may not be retracted. As explained below, a transaction t commits at s i when it is guaranteed that no conflicting transaction can obtain more votes. Transactions can be committed even without knowledge of complete group membership because the total amount of currency in the system is always 1. The protocol guarantees that all servers eventually reach the same commit decisions.
Voting rule. Server s i considers voting for a transaction in the following three cases: There are two important implications of the cases stated above. First, there cannot exist yes votes from the same server for conflicting transactions. Second, locally completed transactions are blocked until the termination of conflicting candidate transactions.
Update Commitment
Given a server s i and its vote set V i , we compute the sum of votes cast for a transaction t as:
We then compute the unknown votes of t as:
where s:curr is the currency held by s. In other words, unknownðtÞ is the sum of the currencies of those servers whose votes for transaction t are not yet available. We now define the commit rule that s i uses to decide which candidate transactions to terminate (i.e., commit or abort) on the basis of local information. The fundamental idea is to commit a transaction when it is guaranteed that no other conflicting transaction can gather more votes.
Commit rule. A transaction t 2 C i commits when, 8t 0 2 C i such that t 0 and t conflict:
1. jvotesðtÞj > jvotesðt 0 Þj þ unknownðtÞ or 2. jvotesðtÞj ¼ ð jvotesðt 0 Þj þ unknownðtÞÞ and t:server < t 0 :server, where t.server is the identifier of the server that executed t.
The commit rule states that candidate transaction t can commit if it gathers the plurality of votes. The two conditions stated above enforce mutual exclusion by ensuring that no other conflicting transaction, which may or may not be known to s i , can gather more votes than t. Note that the latter condition breaks the ties between transactions having the same amount of votes using a simple deterministic comparison between the indices of the servers that created the transactions.
When a candidate transaction t commits at s i , s i incorporates the effects of t into its database by installing the new values of the update items of t (available from t's transaction record) and incrementing the version numbers of the local copies of those items. Finally, the transaction record of t is appended to the commit log. Note that servers must eventually garbage-collect their commit logs as, otherwise, these logs will grow indefinitely.
Abort rule. All active and candidate transactions whose read items are modified are said to become obsolete and are aborted. Additionally, the commitment of a transaction causes all votes cast for an obsolete transaction to be discarded.
Synchronization
A pair-wise synchronization session involves the propagation of 1) committed updates, 2) candidate transactions, and 3) votes that are known to one server and unknown to the other. In Deno, synchronization is controlled via version vectors [28] . Each server s i maintains an n-element vector, vv i , where n is the number of servers which describes the number of events of each other server seen by s i . Element vv i ½j is a scalar count of the number of j's events that have been seen at s i . There are three types of events of interest: transaction commits, transaction promotions, and votes. A commit event is created whenever the local server commits a transaction. A promotion event is created whenever a transaction becomes a candidate on the server where it executed. A vote event is created whenever a vote is cast.
In more detail, server s i maintains a serial order, called local ordering, on all local commits, promotions, and votes for all servers. We denote the pth such event (created by s j ) as e p j . As information about events is always propagated in local order, if s i 's version vector is vv i , s i has seen all events e , for all j ¼ 1 . . . n. Synchronization is then straightforward. We here assume unidirectional pull synchronization, although other modes are possible [17] , [25] . When s i pulls information from s j , the following actions take place: 1. Server s i sends vv i to s j . 2. Server s j responds with all events e l k s.t. l > vv i ½k and l vv j ½k, for all k ¼ 1 . . . n. 3. Server s i incorporates the new events in the same order in which they originally occurred by processing new commitments, candidates, and votes; applying the voting rule, the commit rule, and the abort rule for all relevant transactions; and updating vv i to the pair-wise maximum of vv i and vv j .
Deno's protocol divorces correctness requirements from the communication requirements: Any server can be chosen as a synchronization partner without affecting the correctness of the protocol. It is, however, clear that this choice can have significant performance affects and it is worthwhile to perform more intelligent, directed synchronization at the expense of storing and propagating extra information about the currencies held by the servers [9] . The investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and we assume that synchronization partners are chosen randomly in the rest of the paper.
Consistency and Correctness Issues
We now discuss the consistency level provided by the base voting protocol. See the Appendix for the correctness proofs of the theorems (and relevant lemmas) presented in this section.
We first formally define the consistency level supported by the base Deno algorithm:
Definition 1 (Weak consistency). A query sees weak consistency if it serializes with respect to all update transactions, but possibly not with other queries [5] , [6] , [19] .
In weak consistency, each query observes a serial order of update transactions, which is not necessarily the same order observed by other queries. However, weak consistency does ensure that queries always observe transactionally consistent database states. In other words, a query does not see partial effects of any update transaction. Weak consistency prohibits both update transaction cycles (i.e., cycles involving only update transactions) and single-query cycles (i.e., cycles involving a single query and one or more update transactions).
We can now state the theorem that defines the consistency level provided by our protocol:
Theorem 1 (Weak consistency). The base Deno protocol provides weak consistency (see the Appendix for a proof sketch).
Illustration
We illustrate the basic Deno protocol in Fig. 4 with an example scenario. The system has four servers, each holding a currency of 0.25. Server s a creates a new update, t 1 , votes (yes) for it, and sends a message describing t 1 and its vote to s b via a synchronization session. Server s b votes for t 1 and then later transfers notice of t 1 and both votes to s c . After adding its own vote, s c can commit t 1 because it has gathered a plurality. Later synchronization sessions move the votes back to s b and s a , which also reach the same commit decision. Meanwhile, s d has created a conflicting update t 4 . Eventually, s d learns of t 1 (and the corresponding votes for t 1 from s a , s b , s c ). It then commits t 1 (since jvotesðt 1 Þj ¼ 0:75) and aborts t 4 (since t 4 has become obsolete by the commitment of t 1 ).
Providing Strong Consistency: Extended Protocol 2.4.1 Supporting Strong Consistency
The base protocol ensures that queries always access transactionally consistent data and that update transactions are globally serialized with respect to each other. However, the base protocol does not serialize update transactions with respect to all queries. We now describe an extension of the base protocol that provides strong consistency [5] , [6] , [19] , which we define as follows:
Definition 2 (Strong consistency). A query sees strong consistency if it is serialized with respect to both queries and update transactions. Strong consistency is characterized by an acyclic serialization graph, prohibiting both update transaction cycles and multiquery cycles (i.e., cycles involving multiple queries and one or more update transactions). This form of consistency guarantees globally-serializable executions [5] , [6] , [19] .
The base protocol fails to provide strong consistency because nonconflicting update transactions are not necessarily globally serialized with respect to each other. We address this problem by forcing all update transactions to commit in the same order at all servers by providing mutual exclusion among all transactions, rather than just among conflicting transactions as the base protocol does. We accomplish this by modifying the voting process such that each server votes yes for all candidate transactions (whether or not they conflict), but specifies a total order on all of its votes (using timestamps). The commit process is then restricted so that only the top transactions, which are the candidate transactions that come first in any server's ordering, are considered for commitment.
More specifically, the protocol works as follows: Instead of choosing among conflicting transactions, a server votes yes for all candidate transactions as soon as they are received. The result is that V i contains a yes vote by s i for each candidate transaction, differing only in the votes' timestamps. The timestamps impose a total ordering on all votes created by s i . A transaction may be committed if it gains a plurality of the top votes, where a top vote is the earliest vote in the vote set from a specific server.
There are at least two other approaches to provide strong consistency. One approach is to include queries in the global voting process, which is clearly not desirable in our target environments. A second approach is to commit an update transaction after it is certified by all servers (similar to Agrawal et al.'s protocol [3] ). This latter approach requires contacting all servers in the system, which may be a serious restriction during times of low availability. 
Update Commitment
The updated commit rule can then be stated as follows: A top transaction t 2 C i commits when, 8t 0 2 C i such that t 0 is also a top transaction:
1. jvotesðtÞj > jvotesðt 0 Þj þ unknownðtÞ or 2. jvotesðtÞj ¼ ð jvotesðt 0 Þj þ unknownðtÞÞ a n d t:id < t 0 :id, where t.id is the identifier of the server that created t.
Correctness
The following lemma establishes the unique global commit order of all updates (refer to the Appendix for correctness proof sketches of the following theorem).
Theorem 2 (Strong consistency).
The extended Deno protocol provides strong consistency and serializability.
SECURE UPDATE COMMITMENT
In this section, we discuss how we deal with a specific class of internal threats that result from authenticated but malicious servers (see [11] for a description of how to provide security against external threats). Such malicious insiders misrepresent protocol-specific information and can cause potentially corrupt objects to propagate throughout the system. Under certain circumstances, even a single malicious insider with an arbitrarily small amount of currency can cause different transactions to be committed at different servers. We first discuss the set of malicious actions a server can undertake and then discuss our approach to handling them.
Malicious Actions
Before we classify the actions a malicious intruder can take, we note that malicious servers can always commit arbitrary transactions to their local databases. Malicious servers can also remain within the protocol framework and issue updates that, if committed, obscure or undo the effects of other updates. This type of behavior can only be handled in an application-specific manner and is beyond the scope of this work. Under certain circumstances, even a single malicious server can accomplish a denial-of-service attack by refusing to vote its currency. This attack is handled by the Deno's standard currency revocation mechanism [9] that is used to recover from benignly failed servers. This mechanism requires at least a majority of the currency to be held by nonmalicious nodes, thereby providing liveness assuming at most n=2 b cÀ 1 malicious nodes exist (under uniform currency distribution).
Malicious insiders, therefore, can only corrupt the view of other servers by propagating valid but incorrect protocol information. This potentially causes different servers to commit updates inconsistently across the system, which in turn violates any global correctness guarantees and leads to a divergence among the databases at different servers. In our replication framework, a malicious server can incorrectly report currency values or votes, which we discuss below.
Currency misrepresentation. The problem here is of a server misrepresenting the amount of currency it has. Due to the decentralized nature of the system and the fact that Deno allows peer-to-peer currency exchanges [9] , the currency a server holds cannot be directly verified by other servers. We make this operation secure by requiring each currency exchange to be formalized as an update. A currency transfer from s i to s j is only considered complete when the corresponding exchange update is committed. Note that such exchange updates are commutative with respect to all other updates.
Vote misrepresentation. There are two types of vote misrepresentation:
. 
Vote Validation
We now investigate approaches for detecting malicious servers and develop an algorithm that guarantees correctness at nonmalicious servers. We revise our decentralized update commitment algorithm such that 1) it guarantees correctness even when there are (multiple) malicious servers, 2) it allows progress even when not all votes have been reported, and 3) it provides safety at a node if the node supports a sufficient degree of tolerance (at the expense of potential performance degradation). The central idea is to make commit decisions based on votes that are guaranteed to belong to nonmalicious servers. We first distinguish between validated and unvalidated votes: The former are known to be correct (i.e., nonmalicious) and the latter may or may not be correct. Our approach hinges on the observation that "up to malicious servers can be kept from corrupting the decentralized commitment process if the largest unvalidated votes are not used in any commit decision," where is called the degree of tolerance to malicious servers ( ¼ 0 . . . n À 1).
Consider the following example: If there is a single malicious server, then any single vote may be a duplicate. The server can commit the transaction if the transaction can obtain plurality without counting the largest unvalidated vote for that transaction. This observation follows because 1) validated votes cannot be duplicates by definition and 2) of all the unvalidated votes, at worst the largest unvalidated vote may be a duplicate.
In general, votesðt i Þ consists of validated votes, validðt i Þ, and unvalidated votes, unvalidðt i Þ. Note that we consider votes cast by the local (nonmalicious) server to be validated votes. We denote the currency of any vote v in votesðt i Þ by jvj. Similarly, we denote the total currency for a set V of In order to provide resilience against malicious servers, the nonsecure commit criterion is modified as in the second row of Table 1 . The lefthand side of the inequality provides a lower bound on the amount of currency that t i is guaranteed to have by not using the largest unvalidated votes cast for t i . The righthand side of the inequality provides an upperbound on the amount of currency t j can possibly get. Thus, the amount of currency required to commit t i must be larger than the total currency for any other transaction t j , even if the largest unvalidated votes for t i are in fact cast by malicious servers and are thus not valid. If the server knows of no other transactions t j , but it has not yet seen votes from all other servers, then it simply assumes all unknown votes are cast for some other transaction (analogous to the quantity unknown in the base commit criterion). Note that this criterion is equivalent to the base, nonsecure commit criterion if we set equal to zero (in which case, all unvalidated vote sets are null).
In order to validate a vote for transaction t i from a server s b , a server s a must ensure that all other servers in the system have seen the same vote. Thus, server s a must collect receipts of the votes cast by s b to all other servers. A receipt of server s b 's vote from server s c is a statement of the form "server s b votes for transaction t i ," securely signed by server s c using an appropriate digital signature. Server s a considers a particular vote valid if and only if it has received receipts for that vote from all other servers in the system or if the vote is cast by server s a itself. In order to validate a vote, s a does not need to establish a peer-to-peer connection with all other servers in the system-instead, receipts for votes from any server can be forwarded by any other server in the system. Since strong cryptographic primitives protect the receipts, even malicious servers will not be able to alter the contents of the receipt. Malicious servers may corrupt or discard receipts: Corrupt receipts will be detected by the server validating the receipt, while discarded receipts will be treated as any lost message. In the worst case, malicious servers may affect the liveness properties of the algorithm, but, once again, safety guarantees are intact.
When a server detects a malicious vote while performing validation, it marks the corresponding server as malicious, ignores all further votes from that server, and initiates the currency revocation mechanism [9] to cancel the voting rights of the malicious server. If the server already 
less than the actual number of malicious insiders), the server has to rollback the effects of the update. The Appendix contains a correctness proof sketch of the revised commit criterion.
Illustration
In the following examples, assume the secure commit criterion is used with the assumption that there is at most one malicious server in the system (i.e., ¼ 1). The first example shows that, even under contention (i.e., when there is more than a single transaction competing for commitment), the commit criterion does not necessarily require any votes to be validated to commit a transaction. In order to keep the exposition clean, we omit the timestamp element when representing a vote (as the value of this element is irrelevant for the purposes of the following examples). 
OTHER DENO FEATURES
For completeness, we briefly describe other key features of Deno:
. Exploiting application-specific commutativity information. Applications running on top of weakly connected environments and systems need be designed to minimize conflicts among updates in order to avoid high abort rates [21] . One approach is to have applications export domain-specific semantic information that can be used to modify the application's consistency requirements [34] . Deno's extended protocol supports commutativity procedures to exploit application-specific commutativity information. A commutativity procedure is a simple query over the database specifying an acceptance criterion [21] . If the query is satisfied, the transaction is considered to be valid with respect to the current state of the database. Deno executes a transaction's commutativity procedure (if it exists) if and when the transaction becomes obsolete. If the acceptance criterion is satisfied, the transaction is not aborted. Note that the use of commutativity procedures does not affect the consistency guarantees. . Light-weight, dynamic currency management. In general, the best (target) currency distribution depends on application semantics, expected availability of individual servers, and network topology. Initial currency allocation is nontrivial because no server may have accurate knowledge or estimate about the size of the anticipated set of servers. The system initially gives all currency to the server that created the objects and other servers obtain currency along with their initial copies of the data. Subsequent peer-to-peer currency exchanges allow the system to incrementally converge to any global target distribution [9] , exponentially fast and using only local information (i.e., without global synchronization). . Currency proxies. Deno uses a proxy mechanism to transparently handle planned disconnections of mobile servers [9] , [25] . The key idea is to allow servers to specify proxies to represent them during planned disconnections (during an airplane trip, for example) by voting in their place. A proxy vote is then indistinguishable to the other servers from the situation where a server votes and then disconnects. The result is that there are no race conditions and the entire proxy engagement is transparent to the rest of the system. The use of proxies in this manner can prevent degradation in overall commit rate when devices have expected disconnections.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes the performance of the Deno prototype. Note that the primary advantage gained in combining voting with epidemic information flow is in increased availability. On the other hand, our evaluation focuses on the relative convergence speeds of different protocols as a function of several metrics, including update contention, commutativity ratio, and the degree of security provided by the system. Results relating to the effects of disconnections and intelligent synchronization partner selection algorithms can be found elsewhere.
Experimental Environment
We performed the experiments on a cluster of 15 Linux machines (each with two 400 MHz Pentium II's, and 256 MBytes of memory), each running a single copy of the Deno server. The machines were connected via a 100Mbps Ethernet network and the servers communicated using UDP/ IP packets. We used a small database consisting of 100 data objects of size 20K each. Each server periodically initiated a synchronization session (with a given synchronization period) by sending a pull request to another randomly selected server. We note that neither the bandwidth nor the CPU is saturated in any of the experiments. Each server generated transactions according to a global transaction rate (specified relative to a synchronization period). Each transaction accessed and modified up to five data items. Since our focus is on the performance of the global update consistency protocols, we did not model any read-only transactions. All objects are replicated at all servers and currency is uniformly distributed across servers in all the experiments. The results presented in the following graphs are the average of five independent runs of executing 1,000 transactions in the system. The main parameters and settings used in the experiments are summarized in Table 2 . Our performance evaluation concentrates on relative performance by comparing representative protocols.
We evaluate two versions of Deno's protocol, Denoweak (Section 2.2) and Deno-strong (Section 2.4). Additionally, we investigate two representative epidemic replication schemes. The first scheme, primary, is an epidemic primary-copy scheme that uses a specialized primary server to serialize the updates, while propagating the updates using epidemic flow. This protocol is similar to that used in Bayou [34] . Note that primary-copy protocols trade availability for a presumed advantage in performance. The second scheme, write-all, is an epidemic "ReadOne, Write-All" (ROWA) [5] protocol, where servers can only commit transactions after ensuring that all other servers are ready to commit. Therefore, a transaction has to be propagated to all the servers before it can be committed. Furthermore, when a server observes conflicting transactions, it has to abort all of those transactions to ensure global consistency. This protocol is similar to that proposed by Agrawal et al. [3] . Note that primary and write-all are the only other pessimistic replication protocols that appeared in the literature. We have also not included any optimistic protocols (see Section 6) in our evaluation as they do not provide formal correctness guarantees.
Commit Delays
Unlike traditional synchronous environments where transactions are committed synchronously at all servers, commit times typically exhibit wide variability in asynchronous systems. The time at which the first server commits a transaction is, thus, not necessarily the quantity that best predicts application performance with epidemic information propagation. Fig. 6 presents commit delays by plotting the number of servers that committed the transaction as time progresses for primary, write-all, and Deno-weak, when there is no update contention. Although the primary server commits the transaction quickly, this information propagates to other servers relatively slowly. This is because all other servers must learn of the commitment, directly or indirectly, from the primary server. With the Deno protocols, on the other hand, distinct servers may either learn the commitment from other servers (as in the case of primary, or commit the transaction independently. In the presented example, for instance, about seven servers (on average) committed the transaction independently. The delay between the first and subsequent commits is thus quite small.
One important implication of this result is that the performance penalty of using voting rather than a primarycopy approach is not as large as commonly assumed. The results for Deno-strong (not shown) are virtually similar to those for Deno-weak because there is no contention and thus no conflicts.
Contention Effects
The previous subsection focused on the speed of transaction commits when there is no update contention. Fig. 7 presents the performance results of the protocols under update contention. More specifically, the figure shows the commit percentage (i.e., the percentage of initiated transactions that are committed) results for different levels of transaction generation rate (for 15 servers) for all protocols.
The figure shows that all approaches suffer from the increased transaction rate due to the global update consistency requirement that only one out of a set of conflicting transactions can commit. Under very small transaction rates (TR in [0, 1]), all protocols perform fairly well, achieving commit percentages of around 100 percent. With increasing transaction rates, however, commit percentages drop for all protocols significantly. Overall, primary achieves the best commit percentage, followed closely by the weak and strong versions of Deno. The difference between the two versions of Deno as well as the difference between Deno protocols and primary over the whole range shown is small (within absolute 5 percent). The performance of write-all is significantly lower than the rest of the protocols. In fact, at (and beyond) a transaction rate of 25 (not shown), write-all does not commit any transactions. The main reason for this difference is that write-all has to abort all conflicting transactions as it is not equipped with any mechanism to globally single out a transaction to commit (out of a set of conflicting transactions). The other protocols continue to commit transactions regardless of the transaction rate (not shown).
The most interesting result from this series of experiments is that the base Deno protocol did not appear to have any significant performance advantage of the extended version. The difference between the commit delays of the two with little contention appears is up to an average of 10 percent with reasonable contention. The case with contention was where we expected the most degradation in performance as the requirement of a global ordering effectively increases the number of conflicts. This increase in conflicts, in turn, forces more currency to be inspected before a winner of a given election can be determined. For example, we only need more than 50 percent of the currency in order to determine the winner of an election if there are no conflicting transactions, but we may need all of the currency in order to decide between two or more. However, the increase in required currency is offset by an increase in concurrency. Therefore, update contention does not necessarily increase commit delays.
Speculative Voting and Update Propagation
Recall from Section 2 that a transaction that completes its execution is blocked until the local server has decided whether to commit or abort all conflicting candidate transactions. Blocked transactions can proceed and participate in the global voting protocol only after the conflicting transactions are terminated.
We now propose an optimistic alternative that skips the blocking phase by having the servers immediately vote for all transactions as soon as they finish their local execution. These transactions immediately become candidates to be added to subsequent synchronization sessions. The advantage of such speculative voting is that transactions can make progress, in terms of gathering votes, while the system is still deciding the fate of prior transactions. Speculative votes are most useful when previous conflicting transactions are aborted. As shown below, the advantage conferred by this technique is larger when there are commuting updates in the system. The cost of speculation is that some transactions that will eventually get aborted are propagated through the system unnecessarily, resulting in a waste of communication bandwidth. Fig. 8 examines the benefits of speculative update propagation and voting for varying degrees of commutativity by showing the performance of speculative (Denospec) and nonspeculative (Deno-nonspec) versions of Deno-strong (a description of the modifications required to support speculation can be found in [12] ). Somewhat nonintuitively, larger commutativity ratios result in larger commit delays for the nonspeculative Deno. The reason is that increasing commutativity results in fewer aborted transactions, which in turn increases contention for those transactions that are yet to be terminated. By contrast, Deno-spec's commit delay is largely constant across all commutativity ratios. Speculative voting confers a performance advantage of about 15 percent even with a commutativity ratio of 0, the default case where no transactions commute. The gap increases with commutativity ratio until Deno-nonspec's commit delay is more than twice Deno-spec's at a ratio of 1.0.
The benefits of speculation come at the expense of propagating more transactions and votes. To this end, we investigate the relative bandwidth utilizations of the protocols in Fig. 9 , which shows the amount of information sent across all servers (in KBytes) per committed transaction for Deno-spec and Deno-nonspec. For low commutativity ratios (i.e., up to 0.1), Deno-spec propagates about 4-6 percent more information per committed transaction. Beyond a commutativity ratio of 0.2, however, the speculative protocol sends less information than the nonspeculative version, with the difference increasing as the commutativity increases. At a commutativity ratio of 1, Denospec propagates about 16 percent less information per committed transaction. To summarize, the speculative version not only decreases average commit delays, but it also decreases bandwidth requirements per committed transaction.
Commit Delays versus Degree of Tolerance
Fig . 10 shows the average commit delays for small transaction generation rates (i.e., no update contention), for Deno and write-all, for varying degrees of tolerance to malicious servers. On the x-axis, we vary from 0 (nonsecure system) to n À 1 (max-security system). The Deno curve follows an S-shape: It initially increases gradually with increasing , makes a significant jump in the vicinity of ¼ n=2, and then essentially stays flat afterward. As long as is smaller than n=2, servers do not need to use validated votes to commit an update; it simply is enough to gather sufficient unvalidated votes. However, when is more than half the number of servers, it is not possible to commit updates without the use of validated votes. Vote validation is a relatively costly operation as it involves obtaining receipts from the other servers in the system. This explains the sudden increase in commit delays as exceeds n=2, after which point, commit delays continue to increase as more validated votes are required for commit.
At the point where half of the all votes are validated, updates can immediately commit. The figure also depicts commit delays for nonsecure write-all ( ¼ 0), and secure write-all ( > 0). Since secure write-all requires all votes to be validated for commit, it cannot support intermediate degrees of tolerance as Deno. For all , Deno commits updates significantly faster than write-all, reducing the commit delays of write-all by 40 percent and 30 percent for nonsecure ( ¼ 0) and maximum security cases ( ¼ n À 1), respectively. The most dramatic improvement, 60 percent, occurs when 0 < < n=2 since, in this region, Deno commits updates without validating any votes, whereas write-all has to validate all votes.
Supporting Nonuniform Degrees of Tolerance
We now investigate the performance impact of using different degrees of tolerance at different servers. We expect that the commit performance of each server will be independent of the degrees of tolerance supported by others since each Deno server makes all commit decisions entirely independently and using only local information. To demonstrate the validity of this premise, we conducted an experiment where we let a single server, s, use a degree of tolerance, ðsÞ, different from that used by the rest of the servers, ðrestÞ. Fig. 12 presents commit delay results for s and the rest of servers (averaged) for the cases where ðsÞ ¼ 0 and ðsÞ ¼ N À 1, as we vary ðrestÞ-note that d refers to in the figures. When we consider the commit delay for s when ðsÞ ¼ 0, we observe that it remains essentially flat regardless of ðrestÞ. The same observation holds for the case where ðsÞ ¼ N À 1. It is clear that the commit performance of a server is not affected by the performance of the rest of the system. The commit delay curves for the rest of the system for ðsÞ ¼ 0 and ðsÞ ¼ N À 1 illustrate the complementary case. We observe that these two curves are essentially identical, revealing that system performance as a whole is not affected by ðsÞ. It is therefore clear that the degree of tolerance adopted by a server does not adversely affect the performance of other servers and vice versa. Fig. 11 provides further insight by plotting the percentage of validated votes that are used and available at commit time at each server, averaged over all commits across all servers. No validated votes are used at commit by Deno when < N=2. Validated votes available at commit time at each server are nonzero because each server considers its own vote as validated by default. Notice that Deno requires at most 50 percent of the votes to be validated for supporting any degree of tolerance. On the other hand, write-all requires 100 percent of the votes to be validated to tolerate any number of malicious servers, thereby incurring relatively large commit delays. , all protocols perform fairly well, committing all updates. With increasing transaction rates, however, commit percentages begin to drop significantly. We observe the most dramatic fall for secure write-all: At a transaction rate of 0.4, the commit percentage of secure write-all is~25 percent, whereas the commit percentages of the other protocols are all above 65 percent. Notice that, beyond a transaction rate of 0.5, max-security Deno has a higher commit percentage than even the nonsecure writeall. The write-all protocol lacks any mechanism that can pick one out of multiple conflicting updates and thus has to abort all conflicting updates. Due to this behavior (beyond six and 10 transactions/synch period, respectively), the write-all approaches, both secure and nonsecure, cannot commit any updates. On the other hand, the Deno approaches continue to make progress and commit updates regardless of the update generation rate (not shown). Scalability results (see [11] ) show that the performance difference between Deno and write-all increases with increasing system size.
Update Contention Effects and Scalability

RELATED WORK
The problem of consistent access to replicated data has long been studied in many contexts and a wide variety of solutions have been proposed (e.g., [2] , [5] , [16] , [19] , [33] , [35] ). Because of the intrinsic shortcomings of traditional synchronous replication solutions [20] , [33] , [35] in mobile and weakly connected environments [21] , asynchronous replication protocols have recently gained a lot of attention (e.g., [7] , [24] , [26] ). Asynchronous approaches commonly allow servers to execute updates locally without any synchronization with other servers and propagating updates afterward as separate activities. Due to space limitations, we restrict our attention to asynchronous update-anywhere approaches that utilize the epidemic model [3] , [17] , [24] , [29] , [34] .
Many epidemic systems take an optimistic approach and use reconciliation-based protocols (e.g., Ficus [29] , Lotus Notes [24] ) that are only viable in nontransactional singleitem domains such as file systems. These approaches only ensure that all copies of a single item eventually converge to the same value and therefore are not safe for environments requiring transactional semantics.
Bayou [34] takes a more pessimistic approach and ensures that all committed updates are serialized in the same order at all servers using a primary-copy scheme. More recently, Agrawal et al. [3] described a pessimistic ROWA [5] approach that ensures strong consistency and serializability. Our protocols differ from these protocols primarily in using a novel combination of weighted-voting and epidemic information flow to improve availability and performance.
Holliday et al. [22] also proposed an epidemic quorumbased approach that provides serializability as our extended protocol. Holliday's work assumes a more traditional replicated database environment and static currencies, whereas our emphasis is on making progress under incomplete system information in dynamic environments.
Despite the growing need for secure protocols for managing replicated data, this topic is yet to be addressed for the decentralized, asynchronous environments that we target. Security research in synchronous centralized systems mostly targeted group communication protocols. Ensemble [32] addresses only external security threats providing secure authentication, integrity, and privacy, whereas Rampant [31] is designed to handle Byzantine attacks. These systems are commonly based on primary-copy models to coordinate replica management and require much stronger connectivity and reliable multicast primitives. Secure election protocols (e.g., [15] , [18] ) provide voter privacy and rely on a small number of central facilities for counting votes, but are impractical under weak-connectivity as restrictions in connectivity and disconnections make reliance on central authorities untenable.
Castro and Liskov [8] described a practical replication algorithm for tolerating Byzantine attacks in asynchronous environments where update commitment is centralized and coordinated via a primary-copy server. To the best of our knowledge, the only proposal that addresses system security using asynchronous epidemic information flow is that of Malkhi et al. [27] . Malkhi et al. provided an analytical treatment of epidemic-style update diffusion algorithms that are tolerant of Byzantine faults. This work makes strong assumptions about the number of malicious servers and where and how updates are created and initially received. No previous work, including Malkhi et al.'s [27] , has addressed update commitment in decentralized, epidemic systems and databases.
CONCLUSIONS
We presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of Deno, a highly available object-replication system designed for weakly connected environments. Deno's consistency protocols are based on an asynchronous weighted-voting approach implemented through epidemic information flow. Our voting approach achieves higher availability than primary-copy approaches [34] , and higher availability and performance than ROWA approaches [3] .
Our base protocol ensures weakly consistent executions where update transactions are serializable and queries always access transactionally consistent database states. Our extended protocol provides strong consistency and globally serializable executions by providing a unique global commit order on all update transactions. Both protocols allow queries to be executed and committed entirely locally and without blocking. Furthermore, neither protocol suffers from local or global deadlocks.
We also classified and addressed a specific class of internal security attacks that involve vote misrepresentation. We proposed a secure version of our protocols that handles such malicious actions using a combination of cryptographic primitives, modifications to the update commit criteria, and explicit validation of votes. The proposed protocol is parameterized and can be tuned to trade off degrees of tolerance to malicious insiders and commit performance, thereby allowing individual servers to set arbitrary degrees of tolerance based on their individual requirements and resources.
Our performance study based on the Deno prototype revealed several interesting results. First, the presumed performance advantage of the primary-copy approach over a uniform voting approach is not as significant with asynchronous epidemic protocols. The reason is that epidemic voting protocols allow servers to independently arrive at the same conclusions, whereas primary-copy schemes require all commit information to emanate from a single, distinguished server. Second, our extended protocol performs nearly as well as the base protocol, while providing significantly stronger semantics. The result is increased functionality at essentially little cost in performance. Third, protecting against internal threats comes at a cost, but the marginal cost for protecting against larger cliques of malicious insiders is generally low. Finally, speculative update propagation and voting provides a considerable performance advantage for protocols that use pair-wise communication and this advantage is magnified when application-specific commutativity information is used to decrease the rate of transaction aborts.
APPENDIX A CORRECTNESS OF THE BASE DENO PROTOCOL
We now provide proof sketches for the theorems presented in the paper. We first restate the notion of a serialization graph [5] . A serialization graph consists of vertices and edges, where vertices represent transactions and edges represent constraints on equivalent serial orderings. An edge t i ! t j exists in the graph if t j reads or writes a data item written by t i or writes a data item read by t i .
Lemma 1 (Update consistency).
If an update transaction t commits at one server, then t eventually commits at all servers. It is, therefore, subsumed by the previous two cases (since we do not allow blind-writes). We therefore conclude that t 1 must have committed before t 2 at all servers. A straightforward induction based on the transitivity of the conflict relation asserts that t 1 commits before t n at all servers. This eliminates the possibility of a cycle in the serialization graph, thereby producing the contradiction that completes the proof. t u Lemma 3 (Query-transaction ordering). Let q be a query and t be an update transaction that, respectively, reads and updates item d. The dependency q ! t implies that q commits before t commits and t ! q implies that t commits before q commits, at the execution server of q.
Proof (sketch
Proof (sketch). First, consider q ! t. Query q reads d before t updates d. Query q must have committed before t committed. Otherwise, q must have been active when t committed and the commitment of t would have aborted q (as q would have become obsolete). Now, consider t ! q; q reads d after t updates d. In this case, q must have read d and committed after t since any update transaction (including t) installs its updates and commits atomically. t u Theorem 1 (Weak consistency). The base Deno protocol described in Section 2.1 provides weak consistency.
Proof (sketch). Assume that there is a single-query cycle involving query q and update transactions t 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n , of the form q ! t 1 ! t 2 ! . . . ! t n ! q. Consider q ! t 1 . By Lemma 3, q must have committed before t 1 at the execution server of q, say s. By Lemma 1, t 1 commits before t n at all servers. Therefore, q must have committed before t n at s, prohibiting the single-query cycle assumed initially. Moreover, we know by Lemma 2 that there cannot be any update transaction cycles. Therefore, we conclude that the protocol provides weak consistency. t u
Lemma 4 (Eventual termination).
A candidate transaction eventually terminates (i.e., commits or aborts).
Proof (sketch). Suppose there exists a candidate transaction t that never terminates. We can partition the set of servers into three disjoint subsets as 1) the servers that voted yes for t, yesðtÞ, 2) servers that voted no for t, noðtÞ, and 3) servers that have not yet observed t, denoted unknown serversðtÞ. Assuming that information eventually propagates to all servers, unknown serversðtÞ will eventually become empty. Let the conflict set of t, CSðtÞ, denote the set of candidate transactions that conflict with Therefore, the commit rule will commit the transaction with the most votes (or, in the case of a tie, the one executed at the server with the smallest id) and the rest will be aborted, thereby contradicting our initial claim. Moreover, a deadlock situation due to vote dependencies cannot exist. Such a deadlock has to involve a cycle of the form votesðt 1 Þ > votesðt 2 Þ > . . . votesðt n Þ > votesðt 1 Þ, where t 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n are candidate transactions. Since both votesðt 1 Þ < votesðt n Þ and votesðt n Þ < votesðt 1 Þ cannot be true at the same time, we conclude that such a deadlock cannot exist. Now, consider a blocked transaction t. Transaction t will eventually become a candidate since 1) the set of candidate transactions that t is blocked after will all eventually terminate (see earlier discussion) and 2) the blocked transactions are considered in the order they are entered into the blocked list, so t is not going to wait indefinitely before being considered for candidacy. t u Fig. 16 . Procedure for committing transaction t at server i. Fig. 17 . Procedure for aborting transaction t at server i. Fig. 19 . Procedure for terminating a transaction t at server i. 
APPENDIX B CORRECTNESS OF THE EXTENDED DENO PROTOCOL
Lemma 5 (Global update consistency). The extended Deno protocol ensures a unique global commit order on the set of update transactions.
Proof (sketch). In particular, we show that each server commits the same update transactions in the same order. Assume that t i is the very first transaction that committed at server s. Extending the discussion presented in the proof of Lemma 1 by treating the top transactions to be the only conflicting transactions in the system, we can conclude that t i is the first transaction to commit at all servers. A straightforward induction on the sequence of committed transactions concludes the proof. t u Theorem 2 (Strong consistency). The extended Deno protocol provides strong consistency (as defined in Definition 2) and serializability.
Proof (sketch). Lemma 5 ensures that there are no update transaction cycles. Without loss of generality, assume that there is a multiple-query cycle of the form q 1 ! t 1 ! q 2 ! t 2 ! . . . ! q n ! t n ! q 1 :
Consider q 1 ! t 1 , which implies that there is an item d read by q 1 and then updated by t 1 . By Lemma 3, q 1 commits before t 1 at the execution site of q 1 , say s 1 . Now, consider t 1 ! q 2 and q 2 ! t 2 , which imply that t 1 commits before q 2 and, therefore, before t 2 at the execution site of q 2 , say s 2 . Therefore, by Lemma 1, t 1 commits before t 2 at all sites. Using a straightforward induction, we can say that t 1 commits before t n at all sites. However, t n ! q 1 implies that t n commits before q 1 at s 1 , creating the contradiction that concludes the proof. t u
APPENDIX C CORRECTNESS OF THE EXTENDED SECURE COMMIT CRITERION
Theorem 3 (Correctness of the secure commit criterion).
The secure commit criterion presented in Section 3.2 provides safety at a node if the node supports a sufficient degree of tolerance.
Proof (sketch). Consider n servers s 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s n , with currencies c 1 ; c 2 ; . . . ; c n . Consider a single nonmalicious server s i and the case where there is a single malicious server s m , i; m ¼ 1:::n and i 6 ¼ m. Assume that server s i commits transaction t i using the secure commit criterion shown in Table 1 . There are two cases: 1) s i does not use c m toward the votes cast for t i and 2) s i uses c m toward the votes cast for t i . In the former case, t i gathered the plurality of votes by using only the nonmalicious votes, so the decision is correct. In this case, the commit criterion is more conservative than required. In Case 2), jvotesðt i Þj À c i provides a lower bound on the valid votes cast for t i . This statement follows since jvotesðt i Þj À junvalidð1; t i Þj jvotesðt i Þj À c i as c i ! junvalidð1; t i Þj. The commit criterion in this case is conservative if c i junvalidð1; t i Þj. Therefore, in each case, s i uses only the currencies that are cast by nonmalicious servers toward committing t i . A straightforward induction on the number of malicious servers concludes the proof. 
